Truthful Politics: Introduction by Henry, Chris
Kent Academic Repository
Full text document (pdf)
Copyright & reuse
Content in the Kent Academic Repository is made available for research purposes. Unless otherwise stated all
content is protected by copyright and in the absence of an open licence (eg Creative Commons), permissions 
for further reuse of content should be sought from the publisher, author or other copyright holder. 
Versions of research
The version in the Kent Academic Repository may differ from the final published version. 
Users are advised to check http://kar.kent.ac.uk for the status of the paper. Users should always cite the 
published version of record.
Enquiries
For any further enquiries regarding the licence status of this document, please contact: 
researchsupport@kent.ac.uk
If you believe this document infringes copyright then please contact the KAR admin team with the take-down 
information provided at http://kar.kent.ac.uk/contact.html
Citation for published version
UNSPECIFIED  (2016) Introduction.   London Journal of Critical Thought, 1  (1).   pp. 1-4.
DOI







The London Journal of Critical Thought 
Volume 1, Issue 1 (June 2016) 
 
 
How to Cite: Chris Henry, “Introduction,” London Journal of Critical 
Thought 1 (2016), 1-4 
 
Published: 24 June 2016 
 
 
Peer Review: This article was peer-reviewed internally by a member of 
the editorial collective and by an external reviewer.  
 
Copyright: © 2016 The Author(s). This is an open-access article 
distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 
ShareAlike 4.0 International License (CC-BY-SA 4.0), which permits 
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided 
the original author and source are credited.  
 
Open Access: The London Journal of Critical Thought is an Open Access 





LJCT v1(1) 2016 
 
  
 Truthful Politics: Introduction  
 Chris Henry 
 
 
For too long, critical theory has ignored, or worse disparaged, the idea 
of truth. Truthful political philosophy is often the target of a political 
philosophy which seeks to dismiss claims to truth as uncritical and 
dogmatic.1 Yet, as Meillassoux has shown, casting the notion of truth 
aside out of hand constitutes a fideism akin to the same quasi-religious 
dogmatism that was the original target of critical thought. The claim 
that there is no truth carries the same metaphysical weight as a truth 
claim itself.2 So, for example, when David Cameron told us in his 
2015 New Year’s speech that ‘2015 can promise to be a great year for 
our country - if we make the right choices together’, a critical theorist 
might respond by pointing out that there is no ‘right choice’ in the first 
place. Yet how true is the claim that there is no ‘right choice’? If we 
were to disparage the idea of truth, how could such a claim be valid, 
correct or significant? 
The above problematic underpinned the Truthful Politics stream 
at the 2015 London Conference in Critical Thought. Starting from the 
premise that truth claims were, at the very least, of interest to political 
argumentation, participants were invited to explore issues regarding 
the conceptual, theoretical and practical-political nature of the idea of 
truth. Particularly against the background of post-foundational and 
post-structuralist theory, the stream explored how truth claims could 
justify politics or how, in turn, truth claims could be (politically) 
justified. The following passage from Misak neatly expresses the issue 
at stake: 
 
We think that it is appropriate, or even required, that we 
give reasons and arguments for our beliefs, that ‘rational’ 
persuasion, not brow-beating or force, is the appropriate 
                                                 
1 The author would like to thank the anonymous reviews for their important contributions 
to this introduction. 
2 Q. Meillassoux, After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency (London and New 
York: Continuum, 2008), 28. 
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means of getting someone to agree with us. Indeed, we 
want people to agree with, or at least respect, our 
judgements, as opposed to merely mouthing them, or 
falling in line with them. And we criticise the beliefs, 
actions, and even the final ends and desires of others, as 
false, vicious, immoral, or irrational. The fact that our 
moral judgements come under such internal discipline is a 
mark of their objectivity. The above phenomena are 
indications that moral inquiry aims at truth.3 
 
Henry and Jones both presented papers that investigated the 
legitimacy afforded to political arguments from their foundational 
truth claims. Dissatisfied with the four standard theories of truth 
(coherence, correspondence, pragmatic and deflationary), both Henry 
and Jones developed concepts of political truth, in the immanent 
tradition on the one hand, and the aletheiatic tradition on the other. 
Henry draws on a line of thought that runs from Machiavelli and 
Spinoza through to Nietzsche and Deleuze, to argue that truth claims 
can only be made of the sense by which we understand the world. 
According to this tradition, sense is constituted by the world whilst it 
senses the world and, as such, Henry’s truth is immanent to both. 
Jones, on the other hand, draws on the aletheiatic tradition, where 
aletheia can be translated into ‘un-hiddenness’, or ‘unveiling’. The 
aletheiatic tradition started in ancient Greek philosophy before being 
translated into early Christian and Gnostic texts as ‘revelation’ and 
finding its contemporary expression in the work of Heidegger and 
German mysticism. For these thinkers, the source of truth is often 
revealed by certain events from an otherwise inaccessible/unknowable 
domain. In this sense, individuals act as way of actualising a source of 
truth that is either greater than them (particularly within the Christian 
tradition), or that is held in an inaccessible void. 
Yet why would one wish to move away from standard discourses 
on truth? In contemporary theories, the commitment to truth is no 
longer tied to either metaphysical absolutes or epistemic privileges, as 
it was in the pre-modern period. Rather, contemporary theories of 
truth bind individuals to a fidelity to the object and the practice of 
                                                 
3 C. Misak, Truth, Politics, Morality: Pragmatism and Deliberation (London and New York: 
Routledge, 2002), 3. 
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discourse that is open to challenge and criticism in light of how things 
stand, regardless of one’s privileges. Yet it is not clear how this 
openness to challenge, often advocated in the name of resistance, the 
subaltern, or minority groups, strengthens the idea of truth as much as 
it relegates it to the realm of doxa (i.e. received wisdom). A political 
philosophy that sways with the tide of prevailing opinion can hardly be 
called truthful, and what is truthful may also not necessarily be 
preferable. Both Henry and Jones are therefore attempting to think an 
idea of truth that avoids, on the one hand, a purely pre-modern form 
of truth to which privileged access then sanctions authoritarian forms 
of domination and, on the other, a post-modern form which strips 
truth of any justificatory–and therefore political–weight whatsoever. 
The key distinction between the two positions that follow is 
summed up by Jones in his contribution. Whilst he supports Henry’s 
efforts to resist the oppression of truth claims ‘on the basis of 
dogmatic theological or pseudo-theological truth claims’, he locates 
oppression not in dogma itself, but in the lack of scrutiny bestowed on 
truth claims that actually are dogmatic. Jones asserts that there is an 
unavoidable authority that justifies political discourse, and that, in fact, 
it is pretence to the contrary which opens up the potential for political 
coercion. In other words, the problem is not the dogma inherent in 
truth claims, but the lack of interrogation when dogma is not fully 
exposed and embraced. Jones suggests that a turn to embedded 
cognitive neuroscience is one such mode by which we can scrutinise 
and hold to account claims that are founded upon a political theology. 
For Henry, the problem of coercive truth claims does indeed lie within 
dogmatism itself. It is precisely a recourse to the transcendental that 
constitutes the grounds for political coercion and oppression. He 
maintains that any theory which specifies where truth comes from 
creates a duality between ‘truth as the truth of some-thing and 
anything else which is not that thing’. As a result of this specification, 
such a theory can only ever tell a partial truth, i.e. the truth of what it 
specifies. Crucially then, for Henry, such a theory cannot tell the truth 
of why the theory is itself truthful. The theological authority that Jones 
advocates as legitimising political action is secularised as soon as it is 
described, and we are left with the question: how true is the statement 
“the source of truth is God”? Henry suggests that, rather than a set of 
truthful claims revealed by human action from a theological realm, 
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truth is a function of our sense of the world. One literally makes sense of 
the world, and this sense is truthful to the extent that it is a product of 
the individual learning about themselves in the world. 
Neither of these contributions should be read as full arguments 
in their own right; the purpose of them is instead to reinvigorate and 
provoke the discussion of truthful political philosophy. In this sense, 
neither purports to be as fleshed out as would be necessary to fully 
sustain the claims made within them. Yet what is clear from both 
provocations is that thinking the idea of truth remains a necessity for 
the justification of political philosophy, and that closer examination of 
pre-modern forms of truth are called for to do this. Intended as 
stimulation for further debate, Henry and Jones offer suggestions for 
countering what Meillassoux laments as the ‘fideism of any belief 
whatsoever’. 4  In order to overcome the situation whereby the de-
absolutisation of metaphysics threatens to blunt the critical edge of 
critical thought through the upholding of belief, perhaps a return to 
truth is exactly what is needed. 
 
                                                 
4 Meillassoux, After Finitude, 46. 
